Computers are already approving financial transactions, controlling electrical supplies, and driving trains. Soon, service robots will be taking care of the elderly in their homes, and military robots will have their own targeting and firing protocols. Colin Allen and Wendell Wallach argue that as robots take on more and more responsibility, they must be programmed with moral decision-making abilities, for our own safety. Taking a fast paced tour through the latest thinking about philosophical ethics and artificial intelligence, the authors (...) argue that even if full moral agency for machines is a long way off, it is already necessary to start building a kind of functional morality, in which artificial moral agents have some basic ethical sensitivity. But the standard ethical theories don't seem adequate, and more socially engaged and engaging robots will be needed. As the authors show, the quest to build machines that are capable of telling right from wrong has begun. -/- Moral Machines is the first book to examine the challenge of building artificial moral agents, probing deeply into the nature of human decision making and ethics. (shrink)

This book explores the epistemic side of racial and sexual oppression. It elucidates how social insensitivities and imposed silences prevent members of different groups from listening to each other.

Building artificial moral agents (AMAs) underscores the fragmentary character of presently available models of human ethical behavior. It is a distinctly different enterprise from either the attempt by moral philosophers to illuminate the “ought” of ethics or the research by cognitive scientists directed at revealing the mechanisms that influence moral psychology, and yet it draws on both. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have tended to stress the importance of particular cognitive mechanisms, e.g., reasoning, moral sentiments, heuristics, intuitions, or a moral grammar, (...) in the making of moral decisions. However, assembling a system from the bottom-up which is capable of accommodating moral considerations draws attention to the importance of a much wider array of mechanisms in honing moral intelligence. Moral machines need not emulate human cognitive faculties in order to function satisfactorily in responding to morally significant situations. But working through methods for building AMAs will have a profound effect in deepening an appreciation for the many mechanisms that contribute to a moral acumen, and the manner in which these mechanisms work together. Building AMAs highlights the need for a comprehensive model of how humans arrive at satisfactory moral judgments. (shrink)

There are two seemingly opposed descriptions of the subject in Totality and Infinity : the separate and autonomous I and the self that is ready to respond to the Other’s suffering and need. This paper points out that there is in fact another way Levinas speaks of the subject, which reinforces and reconciles the other two accounts. Throughout his first major work, Levinas explains how the ego is allowed to emerge as such by the Other who constantly confronts it. At (...) certain points in that work Levinas comes to describe the self as a creature given to itself by another. The notion of the created ego allows for both freedom and responsibility as Levinas understands the creature as capable of thinking critically, becoming an independent individual, and turning to the Other in responsibility. (shrink)

Nähere Informationen zu diesem Buch erhalten Sie direkt vom Verlag / For further information about this title please contact Mohr Siebeck.

This paper provides a detailed analysis of how, according to Kant, the moral badness of some third parties’ actions can be established with certainty (by anyone, not only by the agent’s own conscience or by God). This account helps clarify why Kant affirms that some forms of wrongdoing (of which there are a “multitude of woeful examples”) can be demonstrated to be immoral, while excluding the possibility of proving the moral goodness of any action. The paper concludes by arguing that (...) the possible certainty of judgements imputing immorality to actions of others is not rational but rather moral. (shrink)

The development of autonomous, robotic weaponry is progressing rapidly. Many observers agree that banning the initiation of lethal activity by autonomous weapons is a worthy goal. Some disagree with this goal, on the grounds that robots may equal and exceed the ethical conduct of human soldiers on the battlefield. Those who seek arms-control agreements limiting the use of military robots face practical difficulties. One such difficulty concerns defining the notion of an autonomous action by a robot. Another challenge concerns how (...) to verify and monitor the capabilities of rapidly changing technologies. In this article we describe concepts from our previous work about autonomy and ethics for robots and apply them to military robots and robot arms control. We conclude with a proposal for a first step toward limiting the deployment of autonomous weapons capable of initiating lethal force. (shrink)

The Rejected Body argues that feminist theorizing has been skewed toward non-disabled experience, and that the knowledge of people with disabilities must be integrated into feminist ethics, discussions of bodily life, and criticism of the cognitive and social authority of medicine. Among the topics it addresses are who should be identified as disabled; whether disability is biomedical, social or both; what causes disability and what could 'cure' it; and whether scientific efforts to eliminate disabling physical conditions are morally justified. (...) class='Hi'>Wendell provides a remarkable look at how cultural attitudes towards the body contribute to the stigma of disability and to widespread unwillingness to accept and provide for the body's inevitable weakness. (shrink)

The challenge of designing computer systems and robots with the ability to make moral judgments is stepping out of science fiction and moving into the laboratory. Engineers and scholars, anticipating practical necessities, are writing articles, participating in conference workshops, and initiating a few experiments directed at substantiating rudimentary moral reasoning in hardware and software. The subject has been designated by several names, including machine ethics, machine morality, artificial morality, or computational morality. Most references to the challenge elucidate one facet or (...) another of what is a very rich topic. This paper will offer a brief overview of the many dimensions of this new field of inquiry. (shrink)

Quando nos detemos à querela recente sobre o enhancement, especialmente àquela que tem colocado em lados opostos bioconservadores e transhumanistas, não pode passar despercebido que pressuposições e mesmo concepções muito ingênuas sobre o homem se encontram no fundo do debate. No estudo que apresentaremos, buscaremos mostrar duas teses: antes de tudo, tentaremos evidenciar que tal querela formada em torno do enhancement é uma reformulação da querela que outrora envolveu a arte alquímica nos tempos medievais e renascentistas – arte cujo impulso (...) deu grande influxo ao ideal prático-transformador da ciência. Em segundo lugar, mostraremos que a atual controvérsia em torno do transhumanismo padece, em termos ontológicos, de problemas semelhantes àqueles que atormentavam o debate sobre aquela antiga arte. Por fim, deixaremos, entretanto, indicado que o esclarecimento das questões ontológicas envolvidas em tal controvérsia não eliminam necessariamente outras questões de ordem ética e política, as quais precisam certamente de um estudo complementar. (shrink)

For many innovations, oversight fits nicely within existing governance mechanisms; nevertheless, others pose unique public health, environmental, and ethical challenges. Synthetic artemisinin, for example, has many precursors in laboratory‐developed drugs that emulate natural forms of the same drug. The policy challenges posed by synthetic artemisinin do not differ significantly in kind from other laboratory‐formulated drugs. Synthetic biofuels and gene drives, however, fit less clearly into existing governance structures. How many of the new categories of products require new forms of regulatory (...) oversight, or at least extensive forms of testing, remains unclear.Any effort to improve the governance of synthetic biology should start with a rich understanding of the different possible science‐policy interfaces that could help to inform governance. CBA falls into a subset of the overall range of possibilities, and which interface is appropriate may turn out to depend on context, on the demands of the decision at hand. In what follows, we lay out a typology of interfaces. After that, we turn to the question of how to draw upon the range of possible interfaces and effectively address the factual and moral complexities of emerging technologies. We propose a governance model built around structures that we call “governance coordinating committees.” GCCs are intended to be mechanisms for accommodating the complexities of innovations that have far‐ranging societal impacts. The production of biofuels, for example, could contaminate water supplies and have a destructive environmental impact if not managed correctly. The introduction of a gene drive could have economic and environmental impacts that are not restricted to one nation. Forging appropriate means for determining and evaluating those societal impacts, to the best of a corporation's, industry's, or government's ability, is central to responsible research and innovation. Public policy must be shaped in a manner that accommodates as many concerns as possible and minimizes risks. (shrink)

The article starts with the recognition of the fact that each human being is driven by the tendency to auto-preservation and, thus, to persevere in being, secure the corresponding living space and safeguard the proper place under the sun. Societies are understood as societies of self-preserving individuals wherein each member is after his or her own interests. This drive to realize oneself, however, may happen at the expense of the self-realization of others. Violence includes but is not limited to physically (...) injuring or annihilating persons. Recalling the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, the author of the article sees violence as the factor that interrupts any line of continuity between human beings, whereby they are made to play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves, and, thus, are forced or induced to carry out actions that, as such, simply will destroy every possibility for action itself The problem of violence, therefore, resides in a kind of interestedness in which, in the pursuit of own interests, we use and manipulate things, simply reducing them to ourselves. In other words, the present article calls our attention to the fact that each one of us can be a rampaging and ravaging force that not only assimilates things but also exploits and thus inflicts violence upon other human beings. The question here asked, therefore, is the one about the very possibility of violence and peace and, ultimately, if violence can at all be seen as a natural way for our becoming as human persons. /// O presente artigo parte do reconhecimento do facto de que cada ser humano é movido pela tendência à auto-preservação e, desse modo, a perseverar no ser, assegurar o respectivo espaço vital e a proteger o lugar que lhe é próprio debaixo do sol. Nessa medida, as sociedades humanas são compreendidas como sociedades de indivíduos que se auto-preservam sendo que nelas cada um dos indivíduos que as compõem estão simplesmente movidos pelos seus próprios interesses. Mas esta tendência para a auto-realização, contudo, pode frequentemente dar-se à custa da auto-realiza-ção dos outros. A violência inclui, mas não se limita à injúria física ou à aniquilação de pessoas. Assim, retomando o pensamento de Emmanuel Levinas, o autor do artigo reconhece na violência um factor que interrompe toda e qualquer linha de continuidade entre os seres humanos, processo esse em que eles são forçados ou induzidos a desempenhar papeis que, enquanto tais, simplesmente destruirão toda e qualquer possibilidade de acção enquanto tal. Nessa medida, o problema da violência reside num tipo de interesse segundo o qual, no processo de procurar realizar os nossos próprios interesses, nós usamos e manipulamos as coisas, simplesmente reduzindo-as a nós mesmos. Por outras palavras, o presente artigo chama a atenção para o facto de que cada um de nós pode muito bem transformar-se numa força violenta e destruidora que não só assimila as coisas, mas também as explora e, nessa medida, inflige violência sobre os outros seres humanos. Assim, a questão que aqui se levanta, portanto, é a questão acerca da própria possibilidade da violência e da paz e, em última análise, procura discernir até que ponto a violência tem alguma plausibilidade de poder ser vista como um dos modos naturais do nosso devir enquanto pessoas humanas. (shrink)

This paper points out that the idea of creation serves as the “hidden keynote” in Pico’s celebrated Oration. Against the claims of some prominent commentators, the author argues that Pico does not see freedom as the ultimate basis of man’s dignity. By contrasting Pico’s statements with those of Jean-Paul Sartre, it can be seen that freedom for Pico is conditioned. This view has implications for understanding the human condition, the possibilities for self-definition, and for determining the moral worth of various (...) manners of living. Drawing attention to the notion of creation helps one to understand Pico on his own terms and the historical context, and to see how his notions of human will and dignity are distinct from modern and contemporary conceptions. (shrink)

The intent of the exploration is not an attempt to uncover Oakeshott's intellectual influences, but rather to show the importance and coherence of Oakeshott's various themes by showing how they modify, amplify, and contrast with similar and related themes in the thought of seven better known thinkers - Montaigne, St. Augustine, Hegel, Hobbes, Benjamin Constant, Rousseau, and Hume."--BOOK JACKET.

Radical Constructivism and Constructionism. Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, (...) constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. (shrink)